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MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE HUNT FOR and killing
of Osama bin Laden has focused on the remarkable abilities of the U.S.
Special Operations Forces who carried out the raid. Accounts by journalists
and others revealed more than was previously known about the Navy
SEALs who were involved, and sparked complaints by critics that the
Barack Obama administration had leaked sensitive information in order
to portray its own actions in a positive light.1 Terrorism experts have
debated whether the killing would weaken al Qaeda, and what it would
mean for the future of international terrorism.2 And other scholars and
analysts have considered what the story of bin Laden’s death reveals about
American national security and foreign policy decision making. Graham
Allison, for example, writes that “this case demonstrates that the U.S.
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1According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. Navy SEALs who carried out the bin
Laden raid “reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially as the Naval
Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU).” Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Irregular Warfare and Coun-
terterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 27 March
2013, 5. See also Marc Ambinder, “The Secret Team That Killed bin Laden,” 3May 2011, accessed at http://
www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/the‐secret‐team‐that‐killed‐bin‐laden‐20110502, 16 June 2013.
2See for example, Philip Mudd, “The Death of Usama bin Ladin: Threat Implications for the U.S. Home-
land,” CTC Sentinel 4 (June 2011): 1–4; Bryan C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership
Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” International Security 36 (Spring 2012): 9–46.
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government is capable of extraordinary performance in extraordinary
circumstances.”3
Most of this attention has centered on the bin Laden raid itself and the
immediate decision making surrounding it. But an equally fascinating
story, and one with evenmore important lessons for the future of American
intelligence and security, is about how the American intelligence and
counterterrorism communities found bin Laden in the first place. Intelli-
gence insiders have praised the work done by American intelligence agen-
cies, with Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stating, “In my
nearly 50 years in intelligence, never have I seen amore remarkable example
of focused integration, seamless collaboration and sheer professional mag-
nificence.”4 But how did that integration and collaboration come about,
and what does it mean for the future of American intelligence?
The nearly decade‐long search for bin Laden reveals a great deal about
both the capabilities and the limitations of the American intelligence
community. In much the same way that the attacks of September 11 and
the failures of intelligence to correctly assess Iraq’s weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD) program have shaped our understanding of American
intelligence,5 the hunt for Osama bin Laden is likely to be remembered as a
critical case in which American intelligence operations have been exposed
for public discussion. But unlike those previous intelligence failures, this
case is one of intelligence success, and for that reason its lessonsmay be even
more useful for the future.
The successful hunt for Osama bin Laden is part of a broader narrative
about how American intelligence is changing today. The successful use of
intelligence, and the unusually close coordination among the different
elements of the intelligence and national security communities, suggest
that American intelligence may have finally found its footing two decades
after the end of the Cold War shook the intelligence community out of the
procedures and assumptions that had long guided it.6 This case indicates
that we may be seeing the first signs of a new American approach toward
intelligence, with a reduced reliance on the expensive, high‐technology
3Graham Allison, “How It Went Down,” Time, 7 May 2012.
4Ken Dilanian, “In Finding Osama Bin Laden, CIA Soars From Distress to Success,” Los Angeles Times, 8
May 2011.
5AmyB. Zegart, SpyingBlind: The CIA, the FBI, and theOrigins of 9/11 (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 2007); Robert Jervis,Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons From the Iranian Revolution and the IraqWar
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
6Fred Burton makes this argument in “The Bin Laden Operation: Tapping Human Intelligence,” 26 May
2011, accessed at http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110525‐bin‐laden‐operation‐tapping‐human‐intelli-
gence?0¼ip_login_no_cache%3D1e6a46134f3d199fd6fa776de3a08504, 16 June 2013.
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intelligence systems of the past and a greater emphasis on human intelli-
gence and broad‐based intelligence fusion and analysis.
This article first reviews the sources of information available about the
search for bin Laden, and considers whether enough is known to be able to
accurately derive any lessons learned in the absence of an official study or
after‐action report. The subsequent two sections describe the search itself,
beginning with the long effort that led to identifying the Abbottabad
compound, and then the intense push to try to determine whether bin
Laden was living there. Next is a discussion of what lessons this case
provides us about the capabilities and limitations of American intelligence.
The final sections review what scholars have described as the traditional
American approach toward intelligence, and how that approach has been
shaken by a series of what might be called “sea changes” since the end of the
ColdWar. The article concludes by arguing that the lengthy—but ultimately
successful—search for bin Laden represents what might be called a “new
American way of intelligence.”
HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW?
To date, there has been no official, publicly available investigation or
analysis of the intelligence effort involved in the finding and killing of
Osama bin Laden. The lack of such a report may be attributed to the
fact that the intelligence effort was successful; official studies and post‐
mortem investigations are most often seen in cases of intelligence failure,
such as September 11 or the Iraq WMD assessment.7 Most of the informa-
tion we do have about the search for bin Laden comes from journalists and
authors such as Peter Bergen, Seth Jones, and Eric Schmitt and Thom
Shanker.8 Considerably less useful—especially for understanding the
7On intelligence post‐mortem investigations more generally, see Max Holland, “The Politics of Intelligence
Postmortems: Cuba 1962–1963,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20 (May
2007): 415–452, and JohnHollister Hedley, “Learning from Intelligence Failures,” International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18 (October 2005): 435–450.
8Some of the most‐useful sources for this article were: Peter L. Bergen,Manhunt: The Ten‐Year Search for
Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012); Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker,
Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda (New York: Times Books,
2011); David E. Sanger,Confront and Conceal: Obama’s SecretWars and SurprisingUse of American Power
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2012); and Seth G. Jones,Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa’ida
Since 9/11 (New York: Norton, 2012). Particularly useful articles include Graham Allison, “How It Went
Down,” Time, 7 May 2012; Mark Bowden, “The Hunt for ‘Geronimo,”’ Vanity Fair, November 2012; and
Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden,” The New Yorker, 8 August 2011. Questions have been raised about
Schmidle’s article; see C. Christine Fair, “The Schmidle Muddle of the Osama Bin Laden Take Down,”
accessed at http://registan.net/2011/08/04/the‐schmidle‐muddle‐of‐the‐osama‐bin‐laden‐take‐down/, 16
June 2013.
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long‐term intelligence effort—are first‐person accounts or other narratives
that focus on the bin Laden raid itself.9
It is likely that major elements of the search for bin Laden have not been
made public. One of the people best placed to know the truth about the
operation has said, in fact, that we are not likely to know the full story for
some time. Admiral William McRaven, the commander of U.S. Special
Operations Command and the overall military commander of the bin
Laden raid, had said that “I think when the history is finally written and
outlined and exposed on how the CIA determined that bin Ladenwas there,
it will be one of the great intelligence operations in the history of intelligence
organizations.”10 But he added that the full story of what led to the raidmay
not be made public for decades.11
With McRaven’s comment in mind, is it appropriate to attempt at this
early point to examine the lessons learned by American intelligence from
the search for bin Laden, and to draw broader conclusions about the future
of intelligence and national security? This article argues that it is important
to begin such an examination now, rather than wait for an official, declas-
sified account to appear, because the new American approach toward
intelligence has important implications for a wide range of American
political and foreign policy objectives. It is also unnecessary to wait: the
accounts we have today appear quite comprehensive, and inmany cases rely
on interviews (often anonymous) from Obama administration and intelli-
gence community insiders. Those sources can certainly be expected to
portray events in the most flattering light possible, but the outlines of
the search for bin Laden appear to have been confirmed by enough official
sources to suggest that the account we have available is generally accurate.12
THE SEARCH FROM SEPTEMBER 11 TO ABBOTTABAD
Although the actions of the U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel who
carried out the raid at Abbottabad demonstrated remarkable skill, that
operation may actually not have been particularly unusual. Admiral
9The most‐prominent such account is the book by Mark Owen, a pseudonym for a former member of the
SEAL team that conducted the raid,NoEasyDay: The FirsthandAccount of theMission That Killed Osama
Bin Laden (New York: Dutton, 2012).
10WilliamMcRaven interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer at the Aspen Security Forum in Aspen, Colorado, on
CNN, 28 July 2012, transcript accessed at http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1207/28/sitroom.01.
html, 16 June 2013.
11CurtisWackerle, “AdmiralMcRaven: Public Still in theDark About Interesting Aspects of bin LadenRaid,”
Aspen Daily News, 26 July 2012.
12For example, a speech at Harvard Law School by the General Counsel of the CIA on 10 April 2012, which
has been published as StephenW. Preston, “CIA and the Rule of Law,” Journal of National Security Law&
Policy 6 (August 2012), accessed at http://jnslp.com/2012/08/13/cia‐and‐the‐rule‐of‐law/, 16 June 2013.
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McRaven told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that U.S. forces conducted some 11 other
raids that same evening; while he acknowledged that the bin Laden raid
was “a little bit more sporting,” he said it was the kind of mission that they
had been training for and conducting over the past 10 years.13What appears
to have been more remarkable is the decade‐long interagency intelligence
effort to track down the al Qaeda leader. In the words of former Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) official Bruce Riedel, the search “was more the
work ofHercule Poirot than Bond,” as it wasmarkedmore by the hardwork
of analysts than the derring‐do of secret agents with guns.14
The search for Osama bin Laden began shortly after the U.S. intelligence
community lost track of him following the battle of Tora Bora, in eastern
Afghanistan near the Pakistan border, in December 2001.15 During the
next few years, the intelligence community, led by the CIA, applied money,
technology, and ingenuity to the problem, but could not track him down.
Intelligence officials were sent in large numbers to Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and the Counterterrorism Center at the CIA grew from 340
people to 1,500.16 Computer software was used to map out bin Laden’s
family ties and terrorist networks, a $25 million bounty was offered, and
retouched photos were distributed showing what bin Ladenmight look like
without his beard and in a Western‐style suit. Analysts examined the
background of each video that bin Laden released, hoping to find a clue
to his location, and a German ornithologist was even reportedly called in to
try to identify a bird heard chirping in the background of one video.17 But
although the CIA received a lot of what were known as “Elvis sightings”—
leads that went nowhere but still had to be tracked down—it got no closer to
locating the man who was considered High Value Target 1, or HVT‐1.18
13McRaven interview with Wolf Blitzer.
14Bruce Riedel, “Peter Bergen’s Manhunt: The Decade‐Long Hunt for Osama bin Laden,” 29 April 2012,
accessed at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/29/peter‐bergen‐s‐manhunt‐the‐decade‐
long‐hunt‐for‐osama‐bin‐laden.html, 16 June 2013. Peter Bergen makes a similar comment; see his
“Finding bin Laden—More Agatha Christie than ‘24,”’ CNN.com, 11 May 2012, accessed at http://www.
cnn.com/2012/05/11/opinion/bergen‐finding‐bin‐laden/index.html, 3 February 2013.
15Some sources report that bin Laden was located from time to time after Tora Bora; Matthew Aid, for
example, writes that the last hard information on his whereabouts came from an NSA communications
intercept in the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan in 2004. Matthew M. Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret
History of the Fight Against Terror (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012), 103. But most accounts confirm
the assessment of former National Counterterrorism Center chief Michael Leiter, who is quoted by David
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Analysts then tried to step back from the problem, and think about other
ways to locate their target. Interrogation of al Qaeda operatives indicated
that even though senior al Qaeda leaders did not know where bin Laden
was, they were still able to get instructions from him. And the terrorist
leader continued to be able to send out video tapes and pronouncements.
All this suggested that the best approach might be to focus on his contacts
with the outside world. In 2005, a CIA analyst (to whomPeter Bergen gives
the pseudonym of Rebecca) wrote a memo titled “Inroads” that set out four
pillars on which the search needed to be built: his courier network, his
family members, his communications, and his outreach to the media.19 In a
nutshell, the key question was no longer, “where is bin Laden?” but rather
“how does he communicate?”20
Intelligence officials tried a number of different approaches toward
solving the puzzle of how bin Laden was communicating. Some of these
efforts appear to have been somewhat traditional, such as reportedly tap-
ping the phones of the Islamabad bureau of the Al Jazeera television
network to try to learn how they received videotapes of bin Laden’s
speeches, and conducting surveillance of Pakistani journalists who were
believed to have contact with al Qaeda.21 A more creative idea, described by
David Sanger of The New York Times, came from scientists at the federal
government’s national laboratories. They devised a plan to flood Pakistan
with new digital video recorders, each of which transmitted a signal that
could be tracked, in hopes that eventually one of these would come into the
hands of an al Qaeda member who would use it to film bin Laden’s next
video. Sanger writes that “Within months, new cameras seeped into the
distribution chain in Peshawar, where everyone in the tribal regions comes
to shop. It was a pretty brilliant strategy.”22 But as brilliant as it was, it still
did not work.
Operation Cannonball
By 2005 and 2006, the search had stalled. In June 2005, CIA director
Porter Goss said publicly that he had an “excellent idea” where bin Laden
was, but according to Peter Bergen, “In fact, no one at the Agency had a clue
where he was, though most assumed that he was in the Pakistani tribal
19Ibid., 90.
20Peter Finn, Ian Shapira, and Marc Fisher, “A Victory Built on Lessons Learned From the Enemy,” The
Washington Post, 6 May 2011.
21Aid, Intel Wars, 2.
22Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 70. Sanger writes that this program remains highly classified, and that he
withheld some details at the request of government officials.
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region.”23 The CIA’s focus was mostly on the war in Iraq, and George W.
Bush administration officials were becoming discouraged by the effort to
find America’s number one enemy.24 The administration began publicly
downplaying bin Laden’s importance, and in 2006, the CIA even disbanded
Alec Station, the unit that had been set up to track him.25 Juan Zarate,
Deputy National Security Adviser for counterterrorism under President
George W. Bush, said this was “a very dark period.”26
Despite the lack of results (and according to some reports, in response to
public pressure for results), in 2006, the CIA launched what was called
Operation Cannonball, an effort to “flood the zone” in Pakistan and
Afghanistan with case officers in order to find clues about bin Laden’s
whereabouts.27 According to one report, this operation succeeded in getting
the family name of themanwhowas later revealed to be bin Laden’s courier,
butmost accounts agree that this all‐out effort to use traditionalmethods of
intelligence and spy craft was not successful.28 It was during this time that
construction of the house in Abbottabad was being completed, and bin
Laden is believed to have moved into the compound by 2006.29
A theme that comes through in a number of accounts of the search for
bin Laden is the importance of intelligence analysts at the CIA and
elsewhere. These analysts worked behind the scenes, attempting to put
together the clues obtained by case officers in the field or by technical
collection systems managed by any of a number of intelligence organiza-
tions. The analyst who has received the most attention is a CIA terrorism
specialist who has been described by the Associated Press as “John.”30 John
had reportedly been originally brought into the CIA as a Russian and
Balkan analyst, and he had joined the Counterterrorism Center in 2003.
Because the CIA prefers to move its people around regularly, John would
ordinarily have left the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) for another posi-
tion within several years. But he wanted to stay, and he rose to a more
senior position within the CTC. He and the analysts working for him were
23Bergen, Manhunt, 70.
24Ibid., 71; and Finn, Shapira, and Fisher, “A Victory Built on Lessons Learned.”
25Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Closes Unit Focused on Capture of bin Laden,” The New York Times, 4 July 2006;
Dilanian, “In Finding Osama Bin Laden.”
26Finn, Shapira, and Fisher, “A Victory Built on Lessons Learned.”
27Ibid., andAdamGoldman andMatt Apuzzo, “TheManWhoHuntedOsamaBin Laden,”Associated Press,
5 July 2011. See alsoMarkMazzetti, TheWay of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and aWar at the Ends of
the Earth (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 162–167; Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, “Amid U.S. Policy
Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,” The New York Times, 30 June 2008.
28On the courier’s family name, see Mark Mazzetti, Helene Cooper, and Peter Baker, “Behind the Hunt for
Bin Laden,” The New York Times, 3 May 2011.
29On construction of the Abbottabad compound, see Bergen, Manhunt, 3–4.
30Goldman and Apuzzo, “The Man Who Hunted Osama Bin Laden.”
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to play key roles in the hunt, and when the raid took place, John was there
at the White House, just outside the famous photo of the Situation
Room.31
Analysts such as John read everything they could find about bin Laden,
including the sort of unclassified, open‐source material that traditionally
received less respect from intelligence professionals than secrets gathered by
satellites or spies. Biographies of the terrorist leader suggested that he was
so devoted to his wives and children that he would probably still be living
with them, possibly requiring a sizeable compound. In a book written by a
wife and son of bin Laden, “GrowingUpBin Laden,” his sonOmar said that
his father felt the Americans would not risk killing civilians by bombing a
big city, so he maintained safe houses in Kabul, where he thought they
would not be attacked. This encouraged analysts to consider that bin Laden
might not be hiding out in the remote border area betweenAfghanistan and
Pakistan, as most experts had assumed. His references in the videos he
released to current events and movies also made it less likely that he was
actually living in a cave, cut off from the rest of the world. What if he was
hiding more or less in plain sight, in an urban area?32
Big Ocean, Little Boat
It might seem surprising that it could take so many years for the world’s
most sophisticated intelligence system to find one very recognizable man.
But it is a rule of thumb in the intelligence business that in order to find
something, it helps a great deal to knowwhere to look.Without such a clue,
agencies and analysts are reduced to conducting the difficult task known as
a broad area search; in naval intelligence terms, for example, this means
that set against the vastness of the ocean, even a large ship is really a very
little boat, and very hard to find.
A frequently cited example of how difficult it can be to find a single
individual is that of Eric Rudolph, the 1996 Atlanta Olympics bomber, who
remained free until he was found accidentally in North Carolina in 2003.
Another example is that of wealthy adventurer Steve Fossett, who was the
first person to fly solo nonstop around the world in a balloon. Fossett
disappeared in 2007 when the small plane he was flying near the Califor-
nia–Nevada border was lost. Months of searches by authorities and
31On John and the Situation Room photo (the room is actually a small conference room off the main
Situation Room), see the National Security Archive, “The Zero Dark Thirty File,” accessed at http://www.
gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB410/, 16 June 2013.
32Finn, Shapira, and Fisher, “A Victory Built on Lessons Learned,” and Bergen, Manhunt, 92.
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volunteers could not find the crash site; the site was finally discovered by
chance when a hiker came across it 13 months after Fossett had
disappeared.33
Intelligence officials studied past successful manhunts in hopes of find-
ing lessons that could be applied to the search for bin Laden. Cases exam-
ined included that of Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann, whom Israeli authorities
tracked down in Argentina, and the CIA operation that found and led to the
killing of Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar. Even more to the point
appeared to be the search for Mir Aimal Kansi, the Pakistani man who
killed two CIA employees outside the agency’s main gate in 1993. CIA
officers spoke with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent
Brad Garrett, a former Marine who played a central role in tracking down
Kansi in Pakistan four years after the killings.34
The Courier Was the Key
It has been widely reported that the key to finding bin Laden turned out to
be first identifying his personal courier. The story of how that identification
was made began with a man named Mohammed al‐Qahtani, who is
suspected of having been intended as the 20th hijacker on September 11.
In August 2001 he had been turned away by U.S. immigration agents in
Orlando, Florida, after he had flown in to the United States from Dubai. It
was later learned that Mohammed Atta, the operational leader of the
September 11 attacks, had been waiting for him at the Orlando airport.35
Qahtani eventually turned up in U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
after being captured by U.S. forces in the battle of Tora Bora. In 2002,
officials realized who he was through his fingerprints, and they reportedly
interrogated him for 48 days straight.36 According to summaries of the
interrogations revealed by theWikiLeaks website, he eventually namedAbu
Ahmed al‐Kuwaiti as a key al Qaeda figure and confidant of Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, the key planner of the September 11 attacks.37
It was not yet known what role al‐Kuwaiti—presumably a pseudonym
for someone from Kuwait—played in bin Laden’s organization. Then, in
January 2004, an al Qaeda courier named Hassan Ghul was arrested in
33JessMcKinley and Steve Friess, “Remains Are Found at Site of Fossett Plane Crash,” The New York Times,
2 October 2008. More recently, the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 in the Indian Ocean—as of this
writing still unsuccessful—is another example of how difficult it can be to find a small target in a broad area.
34Bergen, Manhunt, 84–87.
35National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 248. (In the September 11 Report. Qahtani’s name is spelled Kahtani.)
36Bergen, Manhunt, 96–98.
37Bergen, “Finding bin Laden—More Agatha Christie than ‘24.”’
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Iraq and was reportedly transferred to a secret CIA prison in Eastern
Europe.38 According to former CIA official Jose Rodriguez, the courier
was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, and eventually told
interrogators that bin Laden no longer communicated by telephone, radio,
or Internet.39 Instead he used a single courier who went by the name Abu
Ahmed al‐Kuwaiti. This was bad news, Rodriguez said, because it meant
that finding him would be even harder than they thought; but at least the
identification of the nom de guerre used by bin Laden’s personal courier
gave the intelligence community a place to start.
The next step was the discovery by intelligence officials of the real name
of bin Laden’s courier. It is not clear how this identification was accom-
plished, and from the point of view of American intelligence officials, it may
be a good thing that some elements have remained secret. Rodriguez writes
simply that “A couple of years later…. the CIA was able to discover the true
name of the courier.”40 According to Peter Bergen, the break came in 2007,
when another intelligence service provided the CIA with the courier’s real
name, Ibrahm Saeed Ahmed.41
Although a full discussion of the role played by harsh interrogation
measures is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that there
is a debate over whether such methods were a key to revealing the identity
of bin Laden’s courier. Rodriguez argues that such techniques were
effective, while Senators Dianne Feinstein and Carl Levin, chairs of
the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, argue that
they were not. Feinstein and Levin state that “the CIA learned of the
existence of the courier, his true name and location through means
unrelated to the CIA detention and interrogation program.”42 More
broadly, they argue that:
The roots of the UBL operation stretch back nearly a decade and involve
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of intelligence professionals who worked
38Ibid.
39Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., “HowWeReally Got Bin Laden,”TheWashington Post, 1May 2012. Rodriguez does
not identify Ghul by name, but he is clearly describing the same person.
40Rodriguez, “HowWeReally Got Bin Laden.”This general outline of events—that the CIA first obtained the
pseudonym used by the courier, and then some time later was able to determine his real name—is also
provided by the CIA General Counsel; see Preston, “CIA and the Rule of Law.”
41Bergen, “Finding bin Laden—MoreAgatha Christie than ‘24.”’Also Bergen,Manhunt, 122 (although in his
book Bergen does not specify that the identification was made in 2007). Mazzetti gives the same account,
citing Bergen;TheWay of the Knife, 270. The courier was a Pakistani national who had been born inKuwait,
and his true name has also been reported as Sheikh Abu Ahmed (Aid, Intel Wars, 2).
42
“Feinstein, Levin Statement on CIA’s Coercive Interrogation Techniques,” 30 April 2012, accessed at
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/feinstein‐levin‐statement‐on‐cias‐coercive‐interro-
gation‐techniques, 3 February 2013.
188 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
non‐stop to connect and analyze many fragments of information, eventu-
ally leading the United States to Usama bin Laden’s location in Abbotta-
bad, Pakistan. The suggestion that the operation was carried out based on
information gained through the harsh treatment of CIA detainees is not
only inaccurate, it trivializes the work of individuals across multiple U.S.
agencies that led to UBL and the eventual operation.43
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has conducted a review of
the CIA’s detention and interrogation program, but as of April 2014, that
report had not been made public.44 If declassified, that report may shed
more light on both the debate over the utility of harsh interrogation and on
other elements of the search for bin Laden and the identification of his
courier.
Disaster, Followed by a Big Break
As President Bush’s second term came to an end in 2008, intelligence
and national security officials did not appear to have relaxed the effort
to find bin Laden. In the summer of 2008, Steve Kappes, the CIA deputy
director, and Michael Leiter, the head of the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), formed what has been described as a highly secret task
force of intelligence experts and people from outside the intelligence
community to think of innovative ways to find him.45 This effort included
greatly increasing the number of drone flights over the tribal areas
along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, putting more CIA case officers
on the ground, and increasing cross‐border raids by Special Operations
Forces.
When Barack Obama became President in early 2009, he directed that
the search for bin Laden be given even greater emphasis. According to
Graham Allison, Obama’s first order to CIA Director Leon Panetta was to
“make the killing or capture of OBL the top priority of the war against al‐
Qaeda.”46 But then in December 2009, the CIA suffered a major loss that
was an outgrowth of the campaign to find bin Laden. A Jordanian triple
agent, who claimed to know the whereabouts of bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman
al‐Zawahiri, was invited to a CIA base in Afghanistan to meet a number of
agency officials. In an effort to treat him with respect and earn his trust, he
43
“Feinstein, Levin Statement.”
44Scott Shane, “Senate Panel Approves Findings Critical of Detainee Interrogations,” The New York Times,
14 December 2012.
45Bergen,Manhunt, 71. Also Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 68, although Sanger says this was in the spring
of 2008, not the summer.
46Allison, “How It Went Down.”
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was not searched at the gate; once inside he blew himself up, killing seven
CIA officers.47
Then, in the summer of 2010, American authorities got a break, when
the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a cell phone conversation
between the courier and a friend. The friend asked the courier, “What’s
going on in your life? And what are you doing now?” The courier answered,
“I’m back with the people I was with before.”48 The NSA had reportedly
gotten lucky, because it had been monitoring the friend; but that call was
enough to give them the courier’s cell phone number and to track him to
northwestern Pakistan.49 In August, Pakistani agents working for the CIA
spotted the courier driving near Peshawar in a distinctive white Suzuki SUV
with the image of a white rhino on the spare tire cover.50Hewas followed as
he drove out of the city—but not toward the remote territory where many
analysts still thought he would most likely be hiding. Instead, the courier
drove to the compound in Abbottabad near Islamabad, where watchers
quickly concluded he was living together with his brother and their
families.51
Although there was no evidence at this point that bin Laden might be in
that house, the CIA analyst named John and others on his team thought he
might be there. In August—apparently before the courier was tracked to
Abbottabad—a female analyst working for John had written a memo,
“Closing in on Bin Laden Courier,” arguing that he was somewhere on
the outskirts of Islamabad.52 Thatmemowas updated and sent out by John
the next month under the title, “Anatomy of a Lead.”53
In late August, CIA’s Counterterrorism Center briefed Panetta about the
new information, telling him they had tracked a suspected courier to “a
place that looks like a fortress.” Panetta asked, “A fortress? Tell me about
47JobyWarrick, “Systemic Failures Led to SuicideAttack, CIA Says,”TheWashingtonPost, 20October 2010;
see also JobyWarrick, “‘TheTriple Agent’: The FinalDays of the Suicide BomberWhoAttacked the CIA,”The
Washington Post, 28 June 2011.
48BobWoodward, “Death of Osama bin Laden: Phone Call Pointed U.S. to Compound—and to ‘The Pacer,”’
The Washington Post, 6 May 2011.
49Scott Calvert, “Md.‐Based Intelligence AgenciesHelped Track Bin Laden,” Baltimore Sun, 8May 2011. See
also TheHistory Channel, “Targeting Bin Laden,” first aired 6 September 2011; and Bergen,Manhunt, 122–
123. This incident is described in a number of other accounts, including Jones,Hunting in the Shadows, 416–
417.Mazzetti writes that theNSA andCIAhad actually beenmonitoring the courier’s cell phone; Bergen,The
Way of the Knife, 270.
50Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden.”
51Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 71.
52Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, “The Man Who Hunted Osama Bin Laden,” Associated Press, 5 July
2011.
53Bergen, Manhunt, 127.
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that fortress.”54 Panetta went to the White House to tell the President that
they had found the Abbottabad compound and suspected that bin Laden
might be there. For the next several weeks, CIA Deputy Director Michael
Morell gave personal updates to Deputy National Security Adviser Tom
Donilon and Counterterrorism Adviser John Brennan, but the information
on Abbottabad was so compartmented it was not included in the threat
matrix that was part of the President’s normal, highly secret daily brief.55
WHO WAS LIVING IN THE HOUSE?
To many observers, the most‐surprising aspect of the search for Osama bin
Laden may be that even after the American intelligence community had
identified the compound in Abbottabad, it was still unable to confirm
whether the world’s number one terrorist was living there. Intelligence
agencies, led by the CIA, deployed every tool in their surveillance arsenal,
and reports indicate that the effort demonstrated remarkable ingenuity and
creativity. But despite the application of as much technology, manpower,
and imagination as the world’s greatest intelligence system could muster,
when it came time for President Obama to decide whether to authorize the
raid by U.S. Navy SEALs, the best intelligence that officials could give him
was an educated guess as to whether bin Laden was in the house.
A team of Pakistani agents working for the CIA rented a house down the
road from the compound, and used it as a clandestine surveillance post.56
Local residents reported that people came knocking on their doors in the
neighborhood, admiring the houses and asking for architectural plans
because they wanted to build something similar.57 Signals intelligence
was of little use because the house had no telephone lines or Internet
connections, and the residents used an impressive level of operational
security. Whenever anyone left the compound to make a cell phone call,
they followed very strict security rules, driving about 90 minutes away
before even putting the battery in their phone.58 They also burned their
trash inside the compound rather than leaving it out for collection.
A number of imaginative ideas were considered about how to confirm
whether bin Laden lived there. Peter Bergen reports that Panetta’s chief of
54Ibid., 124.
55Allison, “How It Went Down.”
56Aid, IntelWars, 2–3, andGregMiller, “CIA Spied on Bin Laden from SafeHouse,”TheWashington Post, 6
May 2011.
57Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 73; and Adrian Brown, “Osama Bin Laden’s Death: How it Happened,”
BBC News, 7 June 2011, accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐south‐asia‐13257330, 2 February
2013.
58Woodward, “Death of Osama bin Laden.”
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staff told the CIA team to come up with 25 ideas for how to get into the
compound, adding that they should not be afraid to be creative. One idea
that was not acceptedwas to throw stink bombs into the compound, forcing
the occupants into the street. Another idea, also rejected, was to set up
loudspeakers outside the house and broadcast messages from a “voice of
Allah” commanding them to come into the street.59 Still other options
considered were to use a miniature unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that
looked like a bird (reportedly one was so life‐like it was attacked by an
eagle), and to analyze local sewage for genetic markers.60
The most imaginative approach—and one that surely would have
worked if this had been a movie, instead of real life—was the hiring of a
Pakistani doctor to run a hepatitis B vaccination program as a ruse to obtain
DNA evidence from members of bin Laden’s family. The doctor, Shakil
Afridi, had reportedly assisted the CIA in the past, and that history could be
part of the reason why Pakistani authorities responded so harshly once the
operation became public.61 He evidently did not live in the Abbottabad
area, but travelled there and hired local nurses to unwittingly conduct the
vaccination program, using real vaccinations. The doctor did get access to
the compound, but never saw bin Laden and did not get any DNA
samples.62
The team watching the house soon noticed that a man came out of the
house on most days and walked inside the courtyard for an hour or two. He
never left the compound, and imagery never provided a clear view of his
face.63 The watchers started calling him “the pacer,” and wondered whether
he could be bin Laden himself—or perhaps a decoy. They knew bin Laden
was at least 6 feet 4, so the National Geospatial‐Intelligence Agency (NGA)
was tasked with analyzing satellite imagery of the compound to determine
his height. According to The Washington Post, the agency concluded that
the man was somewhere between 50 800 and 60 800—hardly a very useful piece
of analysis. Other sources told the Post that the estimate was narrower than
that, but that because the NGA did not know the width of the walls or other
59Bergen, Manhunt, 126.
60Allison, “How It Went Down.”
61The doctorwas eventually sentenced by a Pakistani court to 33 years in prison, although that convictionwas
later overturned and he was ordered to be retried. Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, 279–284, 295–297;
SalmanMasood andDeclanWalsh, “Pakistan Overturns Conviction of Doctor in Bin LadenHunt,” The New
York Times, 30 August 2013.
62Bergen,Manhunt, 126–127; Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 80. Defense Secretary Panetta later acknowl-
edged Afridi’s role in the vaccination program; Robert Burns, “Panetta Cites Key Intelligence On Bin Laden
Raid,” Associated Press, 27 January 2012.
63Bergen Manhunt, 132.
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information to help serve as reference, they were not able to make a very
exact determination.64
Imagery intelligence was useful in other ways, however. An NGA team
spent six weeks building a table‐top scale model of the compound for use by
planners, complete with concertina wire on the walls, a dark red minivan
parked out front, and a white Land Cruiser inside the compound.65 After
the raid, it was put on display at the entryway of the NGA’s headquarters
building, and in May 2012, it was taken to the Pentagon for display.
Imagery was used throughout the planning of the SEALmission, including
in the construction of a rough replica of the compound built at the SEAL
training facility in North Carolina, and at another practice site in the desert
in Nevada.66 NGA analysts checked historical imagery of the area to try to
learn when and how the house had been built. Imagery was also useful in
determining that there was standing water near the compound, indicating
that the water table was probably near the surface. This led the special
operations planners to conclude that they would not be able to tunnel in,
but it also reassured them that bin Laden probably did not have an escape
tunnel.67
Along with satellites, imagery was provided by the RQ‐170 Sentinel
drone, which had stealth technology and could take photos and transmit
real‐time video from high altitude without being detected by Pakistani
authorities.68 Another Sentinel drone later crashed in Iran.69 But even with
drones and satellites, U.S. officials could get overhead coverage of the house
for no more than several hours each day.70
Planning the Raid
In the fall of 2010, CIA Director Panetta briefed congressional leaders and
obtained authority to divert from other accounts the millions of dollars that
64Woodward, “Death of Osama bin Laden,” and Bowden, “The Hunt for ‘Geronimo.”’
65Agence France‐Presse (AFP), “US Spy Agency Unveils Scale Model of Bin Laden Hideout,” 17 May 2012.
66Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden.”On the contribution of geospatial intelligence and the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency in the search for bin Laden, see Marc Ambinder, “In Raid on bin Laden, Little‐Known
Geospatial Agency Played Vital Role,” 5 May 2011, accessed at http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-
house/in‐raid‐on‐bin‐laden‐little‐known‐geospatial‐agency‐played‐vital‐role‐20110505?page¼1, 3 Febru-
ary 2013; also “Osama bin Laden Operation,” National Geospatial‐Intelligence Agency Fact Sheet, NGA
Office of Corporate Communications, 25 October 2011.
67Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden.”
68Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 74. Greg Miller, “Stealth Drones Kept Watch Over Bin Laden Home,” The
Washington Post, 18 May 2011.
69Scott Shane and David E. Sanger, “Drone Crash in Iran Reveals Secret U.S. Surveillance Effort,” The New
York Times, 8 December 2011.
70Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 92.
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would be needed for the operation.71 As has been widely reported, it soon
became clear that it would take more than the CIA’s small paramilitary
force to carry out themission of capturing or killing bin Laden, andmilitary
planning began under the direction of William McRaven, then a Vice
Admiral and commander of the secretive Joint Special Operations Com-
mand (JSOC).72 The decision was also made not to involve or notify
Pakistani officials of what was being planned.
While the operational planning was getting underway, the analytical
effort continued. Intelligence officials wondered: could bin Laden really be
hiding essentially in plain sight, less than a mile from the Pakistani equiva-
lent of West Point? It also seemed unlikely that he would be sleeping in the
same bed every night.73 Perhaps another high‐level al Qaeda leader or even
a wealthy drug lord could be living in the house, or it might all be an
elaborate ruse to throw them off bin Laden’s trail. As many as 40 intelli-
gence reviews were conducted through April 2011, examining and re‐
examining the available intelligence.74 Peter Bergen reports that the ana-
lysts used structured analytical techniques, setting out questions such as:
what is the evidence that the Kuwaiti is actually bin Laden’s courier? How
could the argument be made that he was not? They considered alternative
hypotheses, such as that the courier had stolen money from al Qaeda and
was now hiding in the house.75 Trying to figure out who lived in the house
was a balancing act: the more work undertaken to confirm bin Laden’s
presence, the more people who became involved, the longer it took, and the
more likely it was that the secret would be blown.76
Michael Leiter, the director of the NCTC, had not been briefed on the
planning in the early stages.When he became involved in late April 2011, he
went to John Brennan to urge that a “red team” be established to look at
the evidence from a fresh perspective and try to come up with alternative
explanations for what might be going on in the Abbottabad compound.
Brennan argued that the CIA had already done all that, but Leiter
persuaded him that one more look was needed, by a group of advisers
whowere not already involved in the case. A teamwas assembled, including
two analysts from the NCTC and two from the CIA who had not been
71Allison, “How It Went Down,” and Dilanian, “In Finding Osama Bin Laden.”
72Allison, “How It Went Down.”
73Later after‐action reports concluded that he had never left the compound in the six years before the raid;
Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 92.
74Allison, “How It Went Down.”
75Bergen, Manhunt, 128.
76Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 74.
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involved up to that point. The teamwas told to “murder board” the evidence
and come up with the best case for why bin Laden was not in the house.77
The week before the raid, Leiter reported that the team had set out three
alternative scenarios that could cause problems: the house could belong to
bin Laden, but he only used it occasionally and might not be there now; it
could belong to a different al Qaeda leader or other high value target; or (in
the worst scenario for a raid) it could belong to some other rich drug lord or
Middle Eastern prince in search of seclusion.78 The first scenario was
considered the most likely of the three, but there was no way to know
for certain.79
Then only days before the raid, the whole show was almost given
away when the WikiLeaks website published documents that revealed
that the United States was interested in and knew something about
the importance of Abbottabad. On 25 April, The New York Times
published details about these documents, which concerned detainees
being held by the U.S. government at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.80 One of
the documents was from the interrogation of Abu Faraj al Libbi, who
had been al Qaeda’s number three leader until he had been captured in
Pakistan in 2005. According to the interrogation records, Libbi had
moved to Abbottabad in 2003, after receiving a letter from bin Laden’s
“designated courier” inviting him to become bin Laden’s “official
messenger.” Graham Allison writes that “Had bin Laden’s protectors read
the Times closely … the house could have been empty when the SEALs
arrived.”81
At a final meeting in the White House Situation Room on Thursday, 28
April, Obama’s senior advisers gave him their views, some offering percent-
age estimates of how confident they were that bin Laden was in the house.
But Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has said that such
estimates were subjective. According to Clapper, “Sure, it would’ve been nice
to have somebody inside the compound—the maid or the cook we could’ve
recruited—someonewho could say, ‘Yeah, that’s him and that’s who’s there.’
Well, we didn’t have that.”82
The next morning, on Friday, Obama told his top advisers that he had
decided to approve the raid, and told Donilon to issue the necessary
77Ibid., 91 (citing an interview with Leiter); Bergen, Manhunt, 191–193.
78Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 92–93.
79Bergen, Manhunt, 193.
80The New York Times, “Times Topics: Abu Faraj al Libbi,” accessed at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/l/abu_faraj_al_libbi/index.html, 3 February 2013.
81Allison, “How It Went Down.”
82Bergen, Manhunt, 197.
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orders.83 The President maintained a busy schedule for the next several
days, traveling to Alabama and Florida later on Friday, and on Saturday
evening speaking as scheduled at the annual White House Correspondents’
Dinner. At the dinner it seemed momentarily that there might have been a
break in the tight wall of secrecy surrounding the operation. ABC News
anchor George Stephanopoulos had learned that tours of the White House
would be cancelled for the next day, Sunday, and he asked White House
Chief of Staff Bill Daley, “You guys have got something big going on over
there?” Daley told him it was only a plumbing issue, and remarkably, the
secrecy held through to completion of the raid on Sunday.84 As Graham
Allison put it, “The biggest surprise of the entire operation was that it was a
surprise.”85
The raid on bin Laden’s compound was officially and legally conducted
by the CIA under its Title 50 authority in the U.S. code as a covert action,
but in practice, it was planned and conducted by the military’s special
operations community.86 Leon Panetta, then the CIA Director, said in
an interview soon after the raid that “this was what’s called a ‘title 50’
operation, which is a covert operation, and it comes directly from the
President of the United States who made the decision to conduct this
operation in a covert way.”87 It is not known whether Obama signed a
specific “finding” authorizing the raid, or whether the operation was con-
sidered to be authorized by an earlier finding signed by President Bush after
the September 11 attacks. Jeff Mustin and Harvey Rishikof write that “The
likely legal scenario for this operation was that President Obama issued his
finding, which authorized the CIA to ‘own’ the operation and, under
subsequent Title 50 authorities, allowed Joint Special Operations Com-
mand to conduct the raid.”88
THE LESSONS FOR INTELLIGENCE
It has been widely acknowledged that the bin Laden raid could not have
been accomplished before September 11, or even a few years before 2011. As
Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker describe in their book Counterstrike, the
83Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 94–97; Bergen, Manhunt, 205.
84Bergen, Manhunt, 209, and History Channel, “Targeting Bin Laden.”
85Allison, “How It Went Down.”
86Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, “Spy,Military Ties Aided bin Laden Raid,”Wall Street Journal, 23
May 2011. See also Jennifer D. Kibbe, “Conducting Shadow Wars,” Journal of National Security Law &
Policy 5 (January 2012): 373–392.
87Panetta interview on PBS Newshour, 3 May 2011, transcript accessed at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/terrorism/jan‐june11/panetta_05‐03.html, 3 February 2013.
88Jeff Mustin and Harvey Rishikof, “Projecting Force in the 21st Century: Legitimacy and the Rule of Law,”
Rutgers Law Review 63 (Summer 2011): 1235–1251; Preston, “CIA and the Rule of Law.”
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challenges of international terrorism required that the United States devel-
op new mindsets, principles, doctrines, and strategies, and “The mission
that successfully took Al Qaeda’s founder forever off the battlefield would
not have been possible for the American government to organize and
execute in the years immediately after the terror attacks of September 11,
2001.”89
The search for bin Laden also tends to confirm a comment made several
years ago by then‐CIA Director Michael Hayden about the difference
between the problems faced by the intelligence community during the
Cold War and today. During the Cold War, Hayden said, the enemy’s
forces, such as armies and ballistic missile silos, were relatively easy to
find, but hard to kill. Today, on the other hand, “the situation is reversed.
We’re now in an age in which our primary adversary is easy to kill, he’s just
very hard to find.”90
How, then, did the agencies and analysts of the American intelligence
community find such a hard target?What changes were made that enabled
this successful operation? This section considers first, what worked to
produce success, and next, what does not appear to have been as successful.
What Worked?
The most striking single aspect of the intelligence success appears to have
been the close cooperation between the military and the intelligence com-
munity following the September 11 attacks. Admiral William McRaven
said, “The bin Laden operation would simply not have been possible if
CIA and JSOC had not spent a decade in bed together.”91 This coordination
has been noted before,92 but the search for bin Laden represented an
unusually close convergence of the intelligence and military functions, in
what Schmitt and Shanker have called the “blurring of lines between
soldiers and spies.”93 The appointment in 2011 of former CIA Director
Leon Panetta as Secretary of Defense, followed shortly afterward by the
89Schmitt and Shanker, Counterstrike, 1.
90Michael V. Hayden, “General Hayden’s Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations,” 7 September 2007,
accessed at https://www.cia.gov/news‐information/speeches‐testimony/2007/general‐haydens‐remarks‐
at‐the‐council‐on‐foreign‐relations.html, 3 February 2013. This point has more recently been made by
Mark Bowden. See his interview with NPR, “Technology Helps Track a Terrorist in ‘The Finish,”’ accessed at
http://www.npr.org/2012/10/16/162965855/technology‐helps‐track‐a‐terrorist‐in‐the‐finish, 3 February
2013.
91Allison, “How It Went Down.”
92For example, JohnFerris, “ANewAmericanWay ofWar?C4ISR, Intelligence and InformationOperations
in Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’: A Provisional Assessment,” Intelligence and National Security 18 (Winter
2003): 155–174.
93Schmitt and Shanker, Counterstrike, 244. Also Associated Press, “Raid Raises Question: Who’s Soldier,
Who’s Spy?” 5 May 2011.
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appointment of General David Petraeus to take Panetta’s job at the CIA,
demonstrated this convergence. The CIA has been transforming itself into
more of a paramilitary organization, while the military’s special operations
forces and defense intelligence agencies aremovingmore into the CIA’s turf,
with increased intelligence collection operations around the world.94
Another notable feature of the search for bin Laden is that the success
was more the work of the CIA than of any other individual agency. This
appears to serve as a corrective to the conventional view that following the
September 11 attacks, the CIA had fallen from its position as the premier
American intelligence agency.95 Itmay be too soon to argue that the Central
Intelligence Agency is once again “central” within American intelligence,
and it is unclear whether this signals a long‐term improvement in the CIA’s
reputation and morale. More recently, some have argued that after the
deaths of Americans in Benghazi, Libya, and following the sudden depar-
ture of Petraeus as agency head after an extramarital affair came to light, it
may be time for the CIA to return to a focus on collection and analysis of
intelligence rather than on paramilitary operations.96 The Obama admin-
istration and the CIA’s new director, John Brennan, have indicated that
they intend for it to do just that.97 In any case, it appears clear that among
the many competitive agencies and organizations of the intelligence com-
munity, the CIA has emerged from the search for bin Laden in a stronger
position.98
Another lesson is the importance of all‐source fusion in the intelligence
process. Much of the success was the result of the fusion—mostly within the
CIA—of many sources of information from intelligence collectors and
analysts throughout the intelligence community. There is nothing new
about the concept of intelligence fusion; American intelligence agencies
developed it into an art form during the Cold War.99 But the intelligence
failure of September 11 was largely seen as a failure of fusion and intelligence
sharing, and experts during the past decade have pondered whether the
intelligence community had regained the ability to share and fuse
94Greg Miller, “Military to Boost Its Spy Corps,” The Washington Post, 2 December 2012.
95Rhodri Jeffreys‐Jones, “The Rise and Fall of the CIA,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., The Oxford Handbook of
National Security Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 122–137.
96David Ignatius, “The CIA After Petraeus,” The Washington Post, 15 November 2012.
97Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. to Focus More on Spying, A Difficult Shift,” The New York Times, 24 May 2013.
98Dilanian, “In Finding Osama Bin Laden.”
99The U.S. Navy is often credited with being an early innovator in all‐source intelligence fusion. See, for
example, Christopher A. Ford with David A. Rosenberg, The Admiral’s Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational
Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005).
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intelligence.100 The answer appears to be yes, at least on this one critically
important problem of finding bin Laden.
Finding bin Laden was to a considerable extent a success for intelligence
analysis. Since September 11, the intelligence community has begun to
make greater use of various types of formal analytical methodologies,
and tools and techniques such as “red teams” and “competitive analysis”
have been widely adopted as part of an effort to both make the analytical
process more transparent, and to take advantage of more rigorous and
sophisticated analytical techniques.101 Intelligence analysts have attempted
to make their assumptions and wording clearer to consumers, with Na-
tional Intelligence Estimates including a section entitled “What We Mean
When We Say: An Explanation of Estimate Language” intended to help
policymakers understand themeaning behind terms such as “probably” and
“estimate.”102 Agencies have instituted new courses in intelligence analysis,
and a vigorous discussion has been underway among intelligence practi-
tioners and scholars over whether the business of intelligence analysis can
be made more professional.103
The search for bin Laden provides a number of examples of how these
techniques and methodologies were used, occasionally to good effect. One
suchmethodologywas to approach intelligence challengesmuch as a lawyer
approaches a case or a political scientist conducts research. Rather than
attempt to remain completely objective and just report the facts, the point is
to try to make and prove (or disprove) a hypothesis. This is what CIA
analysts were doing when they wrote papers such as “Anatomy of a Lead.”
The analysts involved told Peter Bergen that they knew they were going out
on a limb by going beyond the specific facts available. But they were trying
to make their case—that the Kuwaiti was the key to finding Osama bin
Laden—and ultimately they were proved correct.
The accounts we have of CIA analysts’ work also tends to confirm other
reporting that female analysts have played an especially large role in the
search for bin Laden. For example, the book No Easy Day, written by
100Richard L. Russell, “Achieving All‐Source Fusion in the Intelligence Community,” in Loch K. Johnson,
Handbook of Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2009), 189–198.
101Center for the Study of Intelligence monograph, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques
for Improving Intelligence Analysis, March 2009, accessed at https://www.cia.gov/library/center‐
for‐the‐study‐of‐intelligence/csi‐publications/books‐and‐monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer‐apr09.pdf,
10 January 2013.
102See the discussion in the publicly released version of the National Intelligence Estimate The Terrorist
Threat to the US Homeland, July 2007, accessed at http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/nie071707.pdf, 16 June
2013.
103See, for example, Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles,
and Innovations (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).
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former Navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette under the pseudonym Mark Owen,
describes a CIA analyst known as Jenwho had spent five years searching for
bin Laden.104 A central character in the movie “Zero Dark Thirty,” which
dramatizes the search for bin Laden, is reportedly modeled on a real‐life
female CIA officer—possibly the same woman.105 Bergen describes the
work of several female analysts, including Barbara Sude, a senior analyst
with a doctorate from Princeton, who had been the principal author of
the 2001 President’s Daily Brief item, “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in
the U.S.”106
A final, remarkable success was the use of operational security, especially
in the later stages of planning and conducting the bin Laden raid. As
Graham Allison notes, one of the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis was
that leaders need time for careful deliberation, especially in circumstances
where the stakes are high and the facts unclear.107 During the 50 years since
that crisis, the spread of information technology and the speed of leaks in
Washington would seem to make it highly unlikely that another adminis-
tration could keep the lid on an operation of the importance and scale of the
bin Laden raid. Yet the secret did not leak out, even though the adminis-
tration had notified Congressional intelligence leaders.108
The decision not to notify Pakistani officials about the raid was probably
an important factor in maintaining operational security, and illustrates
the difficulties inherent in American–Pakistani intelligence sharing.109
Pakistani intelligence officials have a history of opposing U.S. policies,
and Mark Mazzetti describes the relationship between the CIA and Paki-
stan’s Directorate for Inter‐Services Intelligence as having “all the worst
104This is discussed in the review of No Easy Day by Dexter Filkins, “Taking Bin Laden,” The New York
Times, 21 October 2012. Also useful is Eli Lake, “The CIA’s Secret Weapons,” The Daily Beast, 17 September
2012, accessed at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/09/16/secret‐weapons.html, 16 June
2013.
105Greg Miller, “In Movie, She’s a Hero. In Real Life, It’s Complicated,” The Washington Post, 11 December
2012; Mike Hixenbaugh, “Zero Dark Thirty, From a Navy SEAL’s Perspective,” Norfolk Virginian‐Pilot, 13
January 2013.
106Bergen, Manhunt, 75. The role of female analysts in the hunt for bin Laden preceded the September 11
attacks, as many of the personnel assigned to the CIA “virtual bin Laden station” in the 1990s were women,
and some in the CIA reportedly called them “the Manson family.” See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret
History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (NewYork:
Penguin), 454.
107Graham Allison, “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50,” Foreign Affairs 91 (July/August 2012): 11–16.
108Graham Allison reports that when Donilon later learned that Panetta had notified Congressional leaders,
“he was astonished.” Allison, “How It Went Down.”
109On the problems of intelligence sharing more generally, see James IgoeWalsh, The International Politics
of Intelligence Sharing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); and Don Munton and Karima Fredj,
“Sharing Secrets: A Game Theoretic Analysis of International Intelligence Cooperation,” International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 26 (2013): 666–692.
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qualities of a failing marriage,” in which the two sides cannot trust each
other, but cannot split up, either.110 That lack of trust was in full evidence
during the search for Osama bin Laden. The CIA needed sources and agents
on the ground in Pakistan, but informing Pakistani officials was another
matter: Former CIADirectorMichael Hayden said later, “It would not have
occurred to me to inform the Pakistanis.”111
What Did Not Work?
The search for bin Laden illustrates not only the capabilities, but also the
limitations of American intelligence. For example, it was truly remarkable
that the intelligence community could narrow down the search to that one
house in Abbottabad, and then apply so many different techniques to
surveillance: everything from agents in a house down the street, to spy
satellites, to the vaccination ruse were brought to bear. But despite all this
effort, American intelligence was not able to confirm that bin Laden
actually lived there. An important lesson appears to be that more assets
are not always better.
This lesson applies to people: in the early years of the search, the more
agents the CIA deployed to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the more leads were
generated and the more wild goose chases resulted. And it also applies to
technology. Several observers have argued that modern computing and
information technology played a major part in the search for bin Laden.
Mark Bowden, for example, argues that such technology helped American
military and intelligence personnel “connect the dots” and sort through the
vast amount of data available.112 Eric Schmitt andThomShanker also stress
the importance of technology, arguing that “No tool has revolutionized the
nation’s ability to take apart terror networks, or received less acclaim,
[more] than the computer.”113 But even though information technology
was undoubtedly critical to the search for bin Laden—as it is critical to
many aspects of modern life—in the end, number‐crunching did not find
bin Laden; plodding, all‐source analysis of the old fashioned kind was
ultimately more useful.114
It might seem logical to conclude that the intelligence reforms and
reorganizations implemented since the September 11 attacks contributed
110Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, 26–27.
111The History Channel, “Targeting bin Laden.”
112Bowden, “Technology Helps Track a Terrorist in ‘The Finish.”’
113Schmitt and Shanker, Counterstrike, 204.
114For an argument supporting this view, see Mark M. Lowenthal, “A Disputation on Intelligence Reform
and Analysis: My 18 Theses,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 26 (2013): 31‐
37.
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to the success of the search for bin Laden. Intelligence community leaders
have been eager tomake such a claim.115 But the available evidence suggests
that these intelligence reforms enabled the search only in a general way, by
encouraging closer cooperation among the different parts of the intelligence
and national security communities. Less successful were the primary orga-
nizations formed as a result of these reforms—the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence and the NCTC—inasmuch as they appear to have
played secondary roles behind the CIA.
Another important aspect of intelligence reform since September 11 has
been to increase the rigor of intelligence analysis, and as was discussed
above, this effort appears to have been useful. But the search for bin Laden
also illustrated the limits of intelligence analysis—and in particular, the
limits to efforts by the intelligence community in recent years to develop
methods to make analysis more precise. In the final step of providing
advice to the President about the proposed bin Laden raid, each analyst
was asked to provide not only their assessment of whether bin Laden was
in the house, but also their confidence level in that assessment. As Mark
Bowden describes, the result was to add to the President’s confusion,
rather than reduce it. Obama told Bowden that “what you started getting
was probabilities that disguised uncertainty as opposed to actually pro-
viding you with more useful information.” In Bowden’s words, “the
CIA had instituted an almost comically elaborate process for weighing
certainty. It was like trying to craft a precise formula for good
judgment.”116
A final technique that did not prove as useful as some might have
expectedwas the use of open‐source intelligence (OSINT).117 Some valuable
information clearly came from open sources, such as from the biographies
and books about bin Laden scoured by the CIA analysts. And at least one
unofficial open source effort provided interesting results: in 2009, a group
of geography students and faculty members from the University of Cal-
ifornia, Los Angeles (UCLA) used a scientific algorithm to determine that al
Qaeda’s leader was most probably living in a small city or town near the
Afghanistan–Pakistan border. They chose Parachinar as the most likely
town, and although they did not get it right, their analysis was
115James R. Clapper, “How 9/11 Transformed the Intelligence Community,”Wall Street Journal, 7 Septem-
ber 2011.
116Bowden, “The Hunt for ‘Geronimo.”’
117On the strengths of open source intelligence, see Robert David Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” in Loch
K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, vol. 2 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), chap. 14.
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impressive.118 Few intelligence experts would argue that OSINT is unim-
portant today, but the search demonstrated that even in this era of infor-
mation everywhere, the right information may still not be easy to find. The
intelligence that eventually led to bin Laden did not come from open
sources, but was collected by the intelligence community the old fashioned
way—secretly.
THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN STYLE OF INTELLIGENCE
Military historians and security studies scholars regularly debate what has
been called the American way of war, which is typically thought to empha-
size large‐scale conventional conflict.119 Somewhat surprisingly—given the
large literature that has developed on intelligence in recent years—relatively
little attention has been focused on the question of whether there is a
distinctive American style of intelligence.120 Nonetheless, several aspects
can be identified as making up what has traditionally been seen as the
American way of intelligence.
First and most obvious, the American intelligence community was
developed after the Second World War to focus on one particular threat,
the Soviet Union. One result of this focus was what Philip Zelikow has
described as a “Pentagon‐centered” approach to intelligence, with the bulk
of the American intelligence community occupied with defense issues and
theDepartment ofDefense controllingmost of the budget and personnel.121
Richard J. Aldrich and John Kasuku argue that this has created an Ameri-
can intelligence culture focusing on strategic analysis in support of policy-
makers, and in particular aimed at avoiding the threat of surprise attack.122
118Thomas W. Gillespie and John A. Agnew, “Finding Osama bin Laden: An Application of Biogeographic
Theories and Satellite Imagery,” MIT International Review, 17 February 2009. For a discussion of the
methodology used by the UCLA group, see John D. Deniston, “Gleaning Insight from Absence: Intelligence
Tradecraft Lessons from Finding Bin Laden,” Edith Cowan University Research Online, accessed at http://
ro.ecu.edu.au/act/11/, 16 June 2013.
119For a useful recent survey, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, “What Is Wrong with the AmericanWay of War?”
Prism 3 (September 2012): 109–115, accessed at http://www.ndu.edu/press/american‐way‐of‐war.html, 3
February 2013.
120Exceptions include James J.Wirtz, “The AmericanApproach to Intelligence Studies,” in LochK. Johnson,
ed., Handbook of Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge), 28‐38; Uri Bar‐Joseph and Rose McDermott,
“The Intelligence Analysis Crisis,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., The Oxford Handbook of National Security
Intelligence (NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press, 2010), 359‐374; andMichael A. Turner, “ADistinctiveU.S.
Intelligence Identity,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17 (January 2004): 42–
61.
121Philip Zelikow, “TheEvolution of IntelligenceReform, 2002‐2004,” Studies in Intelligence 56 (September
2012): 1–20, at 3–4. A useful survey of the earlier era of American intelligence isMichaelWarner, “TheRise of
the U.S. Intelligence System,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., The Oxford Handbook of National Security
Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 107–121.
122Richard J. Aldrich and John Kasuku, “Escaping fromAmerican Intelligence: Culture, Ethnocentrism and
the Anglosphere,” International Affairs 88 (September 2012): 1009–1028.
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Second, American intelligence—especially during the Cold War—has
been marked by its use of expensive, high‐technology systems. As James
Wirtz puts it, “Americans have an obsession with technology, which is
reflected in their approach to intelligence.”123 William Nolte calls the
Cold War “a golden age of technical intelligence.”124 Jake Blood, one of
the few I am aware of to use the phrase “American way of intelligence,” uses
it to describe the use of sophisticated intelligence technology during the
Vietnam War.125 Although human intelligence has been used extensively,
it has been mostly restricted to the CIA, and in terms of budget outlays,
it has made up a relatively small share of the American intelligence
effort.126
This aspect of American intelligence can be seen in what Uri Bar‐Joseph
andRoseMcDermott have described as the “American intelligence culture,”
reflecting the mass‐production mode of American business and emphasiz-
ing quantity over quality.127 They argue that this produced a “money can
buy anything” mentality, especially at the CIA, and applies to human
intelligence as well as to technical means. Early in the Korean War, they
note, the CIA attempted to mass produce HUMINT by sending 200 case
officers to Korea, none of whom spoke Korean; they ultimately proved
unable to penetrate North Korea.128
The emphasis on technology contributed to a third aspect of American
intelligence: what Bar‐Joseph and McDermott call an “emphasis on oper-
ations over analysis.” At the CIA, in particular, the analytical side of the
house, the Directorate of Intelligence received less attention than the covert
action side, the Directorate of Operations (now the National Clandestine
Service).129 This point is also made by Rob Johnston, who writes that “The
Intelligence Community, in its culture and mythos and in its literature,
tends to focus on intelligence operations rather than on intelligence analy-
sis.”130 Analysis has always been a key part of the intelligence process, to be
123Wirtz, “The American Approach to Intelligence Studies,” 35.
124William Nolte, “Ongoing Reform in the Practice of American Intelligence,”Harvard Journal on Legisla-
tion 45 (Winter 2008): 209–217, at 211.
125Jake Blood, The Tet Effect: Intelligence and the Public Perception of War (New York: Routledge, 2005),
76.
126A useful survey of these issues is Aris A. Pappas and James M. Simon, Jr., “The Intelligence Community:
2001–2015,” Studies in Intelligence 46 (2002), accessed at https://www.cia.gov/library/center‐for‐the‐
study‐of‐intelligence/csi‐publications/csi‐studies/studies/vol46no1/article05.html, 16 June 2013.
127Uri Bar‐Joseph and Rose McDermott, “The Intelligence Analysis Crisis,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., The
Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 359–374.
128Bar‐Joseph and McDermott, “The Intelligence Analysis Crisis,” 362.
129Ibid., 365.
130Rob Johnston, Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 17.
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sure, and in fact many standard texts—typically written by former intelli-
gence analysts—describe analysis as the most important part of the “intel-
ligence cycle.”131 But in terms of the money and attention lavished on it,
analysis has been a poor second behind giant collection systems and covert
operations.
The fourth feature of the traditional American way of intelligence is that
the U.S. intelligence community is widespread, with numerous separate
organizations, a lack of central authority, and a dearth of collegiality that
inhibits information sharing and tends to prevent agencies from working
together.132 This structure—which Mark Lowenthal has described as “wit-
tingly redundant”—can be useful, inasmuch as it brings a number of
different organizations to bear on a problem at the same time.133 But it
also often contributes to intelligence failures, such as when the CIA and FBI
proved unable to coordinate sufficiently before the September 11 attacks.134
And a fifth element that has often been cited as making up a distinctive
American approach to intelligence is what Jennifer Sims has described as a
national commitment to civil liberties and a “deep suspicion of governmen-
tal secrecy and worry about its connection to governmental overreach.”135
Michael Turner writes that a distinctive “U.S. intelligence identity” has been
shaped in part by a suspicion of strong, centralized government, and
ambiguity about secret intelligence.136
Many of the failures of the search for Osama bin Laden reflected this
traditional approach toward intelligence. The attempt to “flood the zone” in
Pakistan and Afghanistan with CIA personnel during Operation Cannon-
ball, for example, demonstrated the same “more is better” attitude that was
described by Bar‐Joseph and McDermott as occurring during the Korean
War. More generally, the failures of the search demonstrated that the best
technology, the most money, and even the most‐brilliant thinking is not
always enough. The things that did work tended to reflect new ways of
thinking about intelligence, such as a greater emphasis on closer collabo-
ration and cooperation among agencies and organizations, and on all‐
source fusion analysis rather than on technical collection.
131For example,MarkM.Lowenthal, Intelligence FromSecrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: Sage/CQPress,
2012), 119.
132Philip H.J. Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17 (October 2004): 495–520, at 503.
133Lowenthal, Intelligence From Secrets to Policy, 14.
134Zegart, Spying Blind.
135Jennifer E. Sims, “Understanding Ourselves,” in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming
U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 35.
136Turner, “A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity.”
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It is important not to overstate the nature of these changes in emphasis
and approach toward intelligence. This article does not argue that there has
been a sudden, all‐encompassing shift in the way American intelligence
agencies go about their business. The traditional American way of intelli-
gence developed over many decades, partly as a reflection of American
history and culture, but also as a response to the challenges posed by the
Cold War. Similarly, the new American way of intelligence has developed
over time, as the intelligence community has shifted and adapted to new
threats and challenges. Those changes can be understood as a series of sea
changes—periods of great uncertainty—that have faced American intelli-
gence roughly once a decade since the end of the Cold War.
A SERIES OF SEA CHANGES
The first sea change for the modern American intelligence community
came during the early 1990s and involved a transition from facing a single
major enemy—a “dragon,” in the words of former CIA Director R. James
Woolsey—to facing instead “a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of
poisonous snakes.”137 In response to the disappearance of its principal
target, the intelligence community went through an intense period of
turmoil and introspection, with as many as four commissions and blue
ribbon studies examining the future of U.S. intelligence active in 1996
alone.138
The lack of a primary enemy did notmean that the job of intelligence was
any easier. In fact, as Joseph Nye noted, the questions policymakers wanted
answered were becoming harder, because they were less likely to be about
secrets whose answers can be found or stolen, and more likely to be about
mysteries, what Nye called “an abstract puzzle to which no one can be sure
of the answer.”139 The intelligence community never really found its footing
during this decade of uncertainty, until the shock of September 11 caused a
second great sea change.
After the September 11 attacks, as Gerald Hughes and Kristan Stoddard
wrote, there was once again a single “dragon” to slay, in the form of al Qaeda
and radical Islamist terrorism.140 Faced with an identifiable enemy, the
national security and intelligence communities became engulfed in another
decade of debate and upheaval over how and whether significant reform
137Douglas Jehl, “C.I.A. Nominee Wary of Budget Cuts,” The New York Times, 3 February 1993.
138Zegart, Spying Blind, 29.
139Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Peering into the Future,” Foreign Affairs 73 (July–August 1994): 82–93, at 88.
140R. Gerald Hughes and Kristan Stoddart, “Hope and Fear: Intelligence and the Future of Global Security a
Decade after 9/11,” Intelligence and National Security 27 (October 2012): 625–652, at 628.
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was needed, and then whether the changes that were made to the orga-
nizations and leadership of American intelligence were sufficient or even
useful at all.141 Experts argued that the earlier distinction between secrets
and mysteries no longer sufficed. Gregory Treverton wrote that new chal-
lenges for intelligence, often involving non‐traditional and non‐state actors,
“do not necessarily repeat in any established pattern and are not amenable
to predictive analysis in the sameway asmysteries.”142 These new problems,
even more difficult to address than mysteries, were described as “complexi-
ties” and “mysteries‐plus.”143
Many intelligence community insiders argue that the changes made
since September 11 have transformed and improved the functions of Amer-
ican intelligence.144 Others argue that relatively little has changed, or even
that things have gotten worse.145 In the growing academic field of intelli-
gence studies there is a considerable literature on changes and revolutions
in intelligence today. Much of this literature is prescriptive, arguing for
more or different kinds of reforms. Deborah Barger, for example, has called
for a “revolution in intelligence affairs.”146 William Lahneman argues for a
transformation in the U.S. intelligence enterprise toward what he calls a
new intelligence paradigm that is better suited to addressing non‐state–
based threats.147 The intent of this article, however, is descriptive as well as
prescriptive, examining the impact of changes that are already underway
and arguing that they constitute a new, more effective approach toward
American intelligence.
A NEW AMERICAN WAY OF INTELLIGENCE
The lengthy and ultimately successful search forOsama bin Laden suggests
that many of the most‐significant reforms to American intelligence
have not been the highly visible organizational changes that have received
most of the attention, such as the creation of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center. Instead,
the key changes have taken place largely outside of public view. Some
141Useful discussions of the challenges are Sims and Gerber, Transforming U.S. Intelligence; Gregory F.
Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
142Gregory F. Treverton, “Addressing ‘Complexities’ in Homeland Security,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., The
Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 344.
143Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 33–34.
144Clapper, “How 9/11 Transformed the Intelligence Community.”
145Gregory Treverton, “Intelligence Test,” Democracy 11 (Winter 2009): 54–65.
146Deborah G. Barger, “It is Time to Transform, Not Reform US Intelligence,” SAIS Review 24 (Winter‐
Spring 2004): 23–31.
147William J. Lahneman, “The Need for a New Intelligence Paradigm,” International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 23 (2010): 201–225.
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of these changes have developed mostly in secret, such as the growth of
special operations forces and their improved integration with intelligence.
Other changes have occurred in the open but below the radar of public
and media attention, such as improvements in all‐source fusion analysis.
Overall, these changes indicate that we are beginning to see a new
American approach toward intelligence that is shaped by three critical
features.
First, intelligence operations are likely to continue to exhibit a closer and
more effective relationship between the intelligence community and the
military—and in particular, the special operations community. The bin
Laden raid has been described as a “proof of concept” of a new U.S. strategy
in the war on terror, and while it is not clear how successful this strategy will
be, it does appear that when intelligence is more closely aligned with
operations in this way it can be more decisive than it has been in the
past.148 Matthew Aid has called such operations “intel wars,” of which the
most‐striking example today is the continuing campaign of unmanned
drone strikes against terrorist targets.149 Some observers argue that these
drone strikes represent amyopic focus on finding and killing terrorists to the
exclusion of other, longer term missions for the intelligence community.150
But strikes by armed UAV’s—even if the Obama administrationmoves their
responsibility from the CIA to the Department of Defense—are likely to be a
major part of our national security strategy for years to come.151
The second aspect of the new American way of intelligence is a reduced
reliance on big, expensive technology, and more emphasis on a balance of
technical collection, human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, and all‐
source fusion analysis. Technology will still be required, of course, such as
with drone strikes, and it will still be expensive. As recent revelations about
NSA surveillance and monitoring indicate, efforts to manage and analyze
“big data” are likely to remain critical for the American intelligence com-
munity.152 But the search for bin Laden suggests that the future of
148Gorman and Barnes, “Spy, Military Ties Aided Bin Laden Raid.” See also Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife.
149Charlie Savage, “TopU.S. SecurityOfficial Says ‘Rigorous Standards’AreUsed forDrone Strikes,”TheNew
York Times, 30 April 2012; GregMiller, “UnderObama, An EmergingGlobal Apparatus For Drone Killing,”
TheWashington Post, 17 December 2011; Robert F.Worth,MarkMazzetti, and Scott Shane, “Drone Strikes’
Risks to Get Rare Moment in the Public Eye,” The New York Times, 5 February 2013.
150Joshua Foust, “Myopia: How Counter‐Terrorism Has Blinded Our Intelligence Community,” 13 Novem-
ber 2012, accessed at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the‐intelligence‐com-
munitys‐gigantic‐blind‐spot/265130/, 16 June 2013.
151Greg Miller, “U.S. Set to Keep Kill Lists For Years,” The Washington Post, 24 October 2012; Mark
Mazzetti, “C.I.A. to Focus More on Spying, A Difficult Shift,” The New York Times, 24 May 2013.
152James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “How the U.S. Uses Technology to Mine More Data More Quickly,” The
New York Times, 9 June 2013.
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American intelligence will not be shaped as strongly by such technology as
many experts predict.153 The Defense Intelligence Agency’s proposed ex-
pansion of its human intelligence capabilities, and recent moves toward
encouraging greater debate and dissent among intelligence community
analysts, are examples of this aspect of the new American way of
intelligence.154
And third, American intelligence will continue to be shaped by the
tension between the active public discussion of intelligence operations
necessary in a democracy and the secrecy required in order to ensure
operational success. Intelligence and its role in shaping American foreign
policy and national security is out in the open much more than it ever has
been; as Charles Cogan puts it, “The CIA has now become part of the
‘household’ of American actions abroad.”155 At times, such as with revela-
tions about NSA monitoring of telephone records and Internet files, this
openness will be seen by officials as creating a security risk.156 The search for
bin Laden and the raid onAbbottabad demonstrate that when it counts, the
American national security and intelligence apparatus is able to keep a
secret. But as future threats and challenges may lie closer to home, and as
the American intelligence community grapples with the challenges of
domestic and homeland security intelligence, that veil of secrecy may be
even harder to maintain, and the need for open discussion will be felt even
more strongly.
CONCLUSION
The search forOsama bin Laden revealed quite a bit about the limitations of
U.S. intelligence, and a rather smaller amount about its capabilities. It
confirmed that we are in a new age in which targets are hard to find, but
easy to kill, and in which close coordination with operations can make
intelligence more decisive than it has been in the past. It also has indicated
that the intelligence reforms of the past decade have had a mixed impact.
While those reforms encouraged the interagency cooperation that proved
vital in the search for bin Laden, they also produced new organizations and
153For a view contrary to this article—arguing that the intelligence community will be greatly shaped in the
future by new challenges arising from open‐source intelligence, social media, and big data—see a report by
the Intelligence andNational Security Alliance, Expectations of Intelligence in the Information Age, October
2012, accessed at http://www.insaonline.org/, 16 June 2013.
154Miller, “Military to Boost Its Spy Corps,” and Lara Jakes, “US Intelligence Embraces Debate in Security
Issues,” Associated Press, 27 May 2013.
155Charles G. Cogan, “Intelligence: the Times They Are A‐Changing,” 4 June 2013, accessed at http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/dr‐charles‐g‐cogan/intelligence‐the‐times‐th_b_3385375.html, 10 June 2013.
156Charlie Savage, EdwardWyatt, and Peter Baker, “U.S. Says It GathersOnlineDataAbroad,”TheNewYork
Times, 7 June 2013.
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procedures that were less useful than older organizations such as the CIA
and its Counterterrorism Center.
This new American way of intelligence is a better way. It was built to
counter the threat from al Qaeda and international terrorism, and it has
proved remarkably effective. But two cautions may be in order. First, will
this new approach to intelligence last? Some of these changes are the result
of policy decisions that could be reversed relatively easily; new leaders at the
Pentagon and among intelligence agencies, for example, could roll back
much of the improved coordination between spies and special forces.
Similarly, there is no guarantee that the intelligence sharing and all‐source
fusion that marked the search for bin Laden will continue, especially in the
absence of a single dominant threat that encourages cooperation. American
intelligence agencies still resemble silos or stove pipes more than they do a
cohesive community, and more needs to be done to ensure that the many
agencies and organizations in the sprawling intelligence system are able to
work together.
Second, will this new approach toward intelligence be appropriate for
tomorrow’s challenges? After the death of Osama bin Laden, America and
its allies may find themselves confronted yet again by a sea change. Al-
though it may be too early to tell, it is likely that the intelligence commun-
ity’s focus on international terrorism will be replaced by concerns about a
larger, more‐diverse set of threats, ranging from domestic and homegrown
terrorism, to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, to unconventional
challenges such as global economic turmoil and climate change. Intelli-
gence agencies will need to be even more adaptable and entrepreneurial in
the future. It took a decade for the American intelligence community to find
and kill bin Laden; it may take even longer for it to come to grips with the
many poisonous snakes it now faces.*
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